Explanation, Understanding, and Subjectivity Essay -- Philosophy Philo

Explanation, Understanding, and SubjectivityABSTRACT Many theorists of commentary from Hempel onward have worked with the explicit or implicit given that considerations of the subjective sense of understanding should be kept out of the formulation of a proper theory of explanation. They claim that genuine understanding of an event comes completely from being in an appropriate cognitive relation to the true explanation of that event. I argue that considerations of the subjective sense of understanding cannot be completely outback(a) from the process of formulating and justifying an acceptable theory of explanation. Although understanding is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for an explanation, understanding is necessary as an initial guide to the personality of explanation. The widespread method of providing counterexamples for criticizing theories of explanation presupposes that there is a neutral method of identifying at least some clear cases of explanation and some clear cases of non-explanations. I argue that the only plausible method to fill this role relies essentially on the subjective sense of understanding. Objective validation of judgments about explanatoriness comes only by dint of a complex process of social correction of our initial intuitive judgments regarding explanation. It is clear that understanding and explanation are related. It is unclear exactly how they are related. We enunciate both of explaining-why and understanding-why some event occurred. Explanations typically produce understanding in those who consider them, and the sense of increased understanding typically comes from consideration of an explanation. Consideration of an explanation can, however, fail to produce in someone an increased level o... ...3-256. Reprinted in Explanation, ed. David Hillel-Ruben, 160-181. New York and Oxford Oxford University Press, 1993.1989. Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy. In scientific Explanation, ed. Philip Kitcher and We sley C. Salmon, 220-252. Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press.Salmon, Wesley C. 1970. Statistical Explanation. In The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, ed. Robert G. Colondy, 173-231. Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted in Salmon et al. (1971).Salmon, Wesley C. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton Princeton University Press.Salmon, Wesley C., with Richard C. Jeffrey and James G. Greeno. 1971. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press.van Fraassen, Bas. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford Clarendon Press.